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Abstract 
 
This study compares the responsiveness of microcredit interest rates to age, scale of lending 
and organisational charter. It uses an unbalanced panel of 300 MFIs from 107 developing 
countries from 2005 to 2015. Three key trends emerge from the results of a 2SLS regression. 
First, the adoption of formal microbanking practices raises interest rates compared with other 
forms of microlending. Second, large scale lending lowers interest rates only for those MFIs 
that already hold legal banking status. Third, age of operation in excess of eight years exerts a 
negative impact on interest rates, regardless of scale and charter type of MFI. Collectively, 
our results indicate that policies which incentivise mature MFIs to share their knowledge will 
be more effective in helping the nascent institutions to overcome their cost disadvantages 
compared with reforms to transform them into licensed banks. For MFIs which already hold 
permits to operate as banks, initiatives to increase loan sizes are key strategic pricing 
decisions, irrespective of the institution’s age. This study is original in its differentiation of 
the impact on interest rates of regulations which promote formal banking principles, credit 
market extension vis-à-vis knowledge sharing between mature and nascent MFIs.  
 
 
JEL classification: G21; G23; G28; E43, N20 
Key words: Microfinance, microbanks, non-bank financial institutions, interest rates, age, 
economies of scale, developing countries  
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INTRODUCTION 
The global microfinance movement has received intense media attention in the past decade. 
This has thrown the spotlight on two key concerns. The first is the high interest rates charged 
by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by comparison with formal sector commercial banks, 
raising allegations of monopolistic pricing (Rosenberg et al, 2009; Yunus, M, 2011). The 
second is related to fears of “mission drift” as many MFIs transform into regulated profit 
maximizing banks with a consequent re-orientation in their services towards the better-off 
among their poor clients (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Frank, 2008; Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2010; Mersland and Strøm 2010, Roberts, 2013;D’Espallieret al, 2017). 
Ultimately the interplay between the characteristics of MFIs and the nature of the 
aforementioned concerns in the debate is an empirical matter. Unfortunately, these important 
issues have remained largely untested, primarily because of a lack of variation in the 
attributes of MFIs including the pattern of interest rates charged by different institutions. In 
this paper, we resolve this difficulty by using a panel framework comprising 300 financially 
self-sufficient MFIs (hereafter referred to as FSS-MFIs) from 107 countries across six 
developing regions from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) database2. The 
decision to focus on financially “successful” MFI’s derives from the argument by Rosenberg 
et al (2009) and Cull et al (2009) that the inclusion of subsidized MFIs substantially lowered 
the average interest rates reported in previous studies. Further, Basharat (2015) found that the 
role of firm characteristics in determining the lending interest rate in the microfinance 
industry may depend on whether the institution is financially efficient or not. Nonetheless, 
Cull et al (2009) reported that the correlation between financial outcomes in terms of 
operationally self-sufficiency (OSS) and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is positively 
significant at circa 0.89. Such a high correlation, although not perfect, indicates that the two 
measures of financial performance are somewhat interchangeable.  
This study contributes to the microfinance empirical literature in two ways. 
First, it investigates whether the annual average interest rates observed for FSS-MFIs 
with the legal entitlement to conduct traditional banking activities are significantly higher 
                                                          
2
 Several editions of the Microbanking Bulletin (MBB) defines a financially sustainable MFI as an institution 
where inflation adjusted financial income minus monetary and in-kind donated goods, technical assistance and 
other services exceeds the sum of inflation adjusted operating costs, impaired losses on loans and the financial 
expenses arising from both the actual and predicted costs of acquiring goods and services for which it is not 
paying a market rate.    
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than the rates charged by MFIs with a different charter status. We differentiate between the 
interest rates of rural and other microbanks (hereafter referred to as MICROBANKs) vis-à-
vis those of non-governmental institutions (NGOs), non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
and credit unions/cooperatives located in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle 
East, Eastern and Central Europe, East Asia, South Asia and Latin America regions3. The 
results should highlight the responsiveness of microcredit interest rates to changes in the 
regulatory frameworks which oversee the practices of MFIs in developing economies. A 
similar empirical study by Campion et al (2010) examined the relationship between 
operational self-sufficiency and portfolio yield in a study of twenty-nine institutions in seven 
Caribbean countries from 2005 to 2008. However, their study was constrained by data and 
methodological issues. This paper reduces these limitations by increasing the number of 
MFIs, countries, time periods and by using a more rigorous econometric method.  
Second, statistics show that MFIs which are classified as financially self-sufficient 
institutions by MIX analysts tend to be older with larger levels of lending. We therefore 
investigate the interaction between interest rates, scale economies and years of experience of 
microbank versus nonbank credit providers. The outcome should help reveal the extent to 
which policy actions which promote the learning which comes from years of practice and 
growth in the scale of loan operation are likely to be more effective pricing strategies than 
initiatives which encourage microfinance institutions to transform into formal banks.  
The paper is organised into four sections. Section I provides an overview of our 
dataset on the annual average interest rates of those 300 FSS-MFIs located in 107 countries 
which consistently reported on the MIX MARKET platform4 information on nominal interest 
rates and all of its four major components — cost of funds, operating costs, loan loss 
provision rate and profits5 from 2005 to 2015.The choice of time period is limited by the 
availability of data on all of these five variables at the time of writing. We further compare 
the variation in these annual average interest rates across the four categories notably, 
                                                          
3Choice of MFI charter types and regions is based on the classification by the Microfinance Information 
eXchange (MIX) 2009. Interested readers may have a look at the Index of Indicators and Definitions available 
in various issues of the MBB. 
4To the best of our knowledge, the MIX MARKET platform contains the most reliable publicly available data 
on detail financial information which are comparable for a large number of individual microfinance institutions 
across developing countries over a relatively long time period. Indeed, Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) noted 
that MIX MARKET reports on up to 2,500 MFIs serving some 67 million clients around the world. 
5
 According to Gonzalez (2010), the formula for MFI interest income is expressed as follows: Interest + fee 
income from loans and other financial services = Cost of funds + Loan loss expense + Operating expense + 
Profit + Tax minus Income from non-financial activities. 
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MICROBANKs versus those of (i) NGOs, (ii) NBFIs and (iii) credit unions. These specific 
dummy variables which we have created for the different types of MFI follow from the 
classification by MIX MARKET analysts and utilised by Cull et al (2009), Hermes et al 
(2011), Nwachukwu (2014) and Basharat et al (2015). Section II outlines the empirical 
research model, hypotheses and the basic features of our estimation method. Section III 
presents the results of our empirical analysis and further explains the relative impact on 
interest rates of age, scale of operations and legal status. Section IV draws conclusions with 
related policies from the empirical findings.  
I. Data Description 
Our argument here is conducted under: (i) sample selection, (ii) sample distribution and (iii) 
microcredit interest rates.  
1.1: Sample Selection 
In this section, we summarise the key trends in the actual annual average interest income 
earned by our different types of FSS-MFIs of different age and scale between 2005 and 2015 
using a standard descriptive statistical method. As we noted earlier, our data is obtained only 
from the publically available MIXMARKET website so as to ensure conformity and 
reliability in their measurement (Hermes et al, 2007; Cull et al, 2007; Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Gonzalez, 2007; Cotler and Almazan, 2013; Nwachukwu, 2014). 
Notwithstanding these benefits, these authors expressed concern regarding the self-selection 
bias inherent in the MIX dataset. They noted that participation by MFIs in the MIX is 
voluntary, and thus the database is skewed towards the more successful MFIs with adequate 
staff and information systems. These institutions are more likely than others to expose their 
private financial accounts to external examination and to satisfy the minimum requirements 
of auditing firms and MIX analysts. Moreover, these organisations tend to be large, focusing 
on financial and profitability goals compared with those MFIs which were not covered in the 
MIX MARKET dataset. Nevertheless, the MIX database is commonly used in the 
microfinance empirical literature on the assumption that those institutions which report to it 
collectively serve a sufficiently large fraction of active microcredit users worldwide (see for 
example, Honohan, 2004 and Cull et al, 2007). 
The periodicity of data used in this study is dictated bya complete availability of 
annual data on interest rates and its aforementioned four key components. This is accessible 
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for 300 financial self-sufficient microlenders located in 107 countries throughout our six 
developing regions from 2005 to 2015. Given the time period considered and the number of 
data points which these institutions reported to MIX MARKET on nominal interest rates, its 
aforementioned four components and the other determinants which we have chosen to 
include in a subsequent regression model, we were able to generate an unbalanced cross 
section-time series panel data of between 2785 to 3000 observations. Appendix Table 1 
reports the mean and standard deviation for all the variables which underlie our analysis for 
our five classes of MFIs subdivided across their age and scale of their lending operations6. 
1.2: Sample Distribution 
Figures 1A and 1B show the distribution of our data set across the different types of our 
sustainable microcredit providers, as well as in terms of their age and scale of lending in that 
order. Figure 1A shows that our sample of study is dominated by NGOs and NBFIs. 
Collectively, these supposedly socially-orientated MFIs make up two-thirds of our dataset. 
The fact that these MFIs form the largest proportion of our sample, and by inference that of 
the developing country-microfinance industry as a whole, should not be a surprise. This 
indicates that the recent concentration on microbanks in the media and policy debate does not 
merit their relative importance.  
As shown in Figure 1B, the majority of financially-viable NGOs are mature, small- 
medium scale programmes with a gross profit margin in excess of 40 percent. By contrast, 
more than half of FSS-NBFIs, which may include registered money lenders, micro-insurance, 
micro-equity, pawn shops, payday lenders, check cashing and currency exchange firms, are 
probably new initiatives which have mostly been set up in the past five years by large-scale 
institutions. Their profit margins are evenly spread across our chosen three sub-samples of 
profitability. This is probably an indication of the wide diversity of type and number of 
institutions, financial contracts, products and services which they offered.  
                                                          
6
  To conserve space, other statistics, including median, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis which 
provide a more detailed description of the distributions of variables across our five types of MFIs are not 
reported here but are available from the authors on request.  
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1.3:Microcredit Interest Rates 
Consistent with Cull et al (2007), interest charges (also known as yield on gross loan 
portfolio) on microloans (YLD) is calculated as the sum of all interest, fees and commissions 
actually received by an MFI weighted by the size of its outstanding gross loan portfolio 
(GLP). Figures 2A and 2B show the annual average interest income earned by our group of 
FSS-MFIs reported by the type, age and scale of their operations respectively. Unlike, Cull et 
al (2007), we use nominal rather than real interest rates in order to capture the higher risk of 
defaults, costs of administration and other complications faced by MFIs which charge the 
comparatively high  rates which cover inflation. In any event, as observed by Woller and 
Schreiner (2002), the nominal portfolio yield (YLD) is highly positively correlated with the 
real yield. Thus, nominal rather than real portfolio yield is an appropriate proxy for the actual 
interest rate charged on loans. Four key patterns are observed from Figures 2A and 2B. 
First, the statistics in both figures 2A and 2B indicate that the annual average interest 
income for our typical FSS-MFI was 28.48 percent of gross loan portfolio (GLP) outstanding 
with a standard deviation of 17.75 percent. Overall, our dataset shows that the interest 
charged by our group of FSS-MFIs varied considerable between minimum of 0.001 percent 
and maximum of 243 percent. The average value is lower than the mean interest rate of 35.4 
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percent and 36 percent reported by Cull et al (2007) and Campion et al (2010) respectively, 
perhaps reflecting the concerted effort by activists and the general media to name and shame 
MFIs that charge “exorbitant” rates.  
A disentangling of data by type of MFI shows a wide variation in the average interest 
rate charged. Contrary to popular belief, the highest average interest rates of between 29.81 
percent and 31.68 percent per annum were observed for NGOs and NBFIs in that order. This 
is presumably because NGOs and NBFIs are expected to lend to the poorest households 
without collateral and so have higher premium for risk. Moreover, these deprived clients 
borrow in small amounts and therefore also have greater unit administration costs, not to 
mention the high salary and cost of hiring foreign NGO workers, including vehicles, security, 
accommodation and offices. Besides, Campion et al (2010) remarked that these 
underprivileged borrowers may be more concerned with access to capital rather than “cheap” 
loans. They therefore could be unresponsive to price increases, permitting those MFIs which 
purport to serve them to offer credit at considerably high interest rates. What is more, the 
absence of effective regulation and public scrutiny may have allowed such socially-orientated 
institutions to charge interest rates which are significantly higher than their average costs, 
compared with commercialised microfinance banks which often attract intense media 
attention and possible censure. Thus, decisions on whether FSS-NGOs and NBFIs are 
meeting their professed social obligations must be based on the presumption that a large 
proportion of the relatively high profits of more than 40 percent which are reported for NGOs 
in Figure 1B are channelled into community-based projects which ultimately raise the 
economic wellbeing of their borrowers. 
Second, the group of FSS-credit unions have the lowest average rates amongst our 
five types of MFIs at 20.05 percent a year. This is comparable to the 22.2 percent reported by 
Cull et al (2009). The relatively low interest rates levied by credit unions are to be expected. 
These are not-for-profit cooperative financial institutions owned by their members who pool 
their money to provide loans and other financial services. This should reduce the need to raise 
finance from more expensive external sources, leading to a lower cost of basic finance and 
the interest rate there from. Then too, the profits from other services, notably from marketing 
members’ inputs and outputs, may be used to cross-subsidize interest rates and extract 
repayment of loans. Besides, the cooperative structure of credit unions is designed to ensure 
fair dealing. Consequently, interest rates which are deemed to be “excessively” high are 
unlikely to be countenanced by members. Additionally, members and borrowers of credit 
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unions are often the same people and so are jointly responsible for the administration and 
repayment of loans. This sense of collective liability would doubtless lead to lower default 
rates and management costs with a consequent decline in interest charges. Also, credit unions 
are often local institutions and, as shown in Figure 1B, are mostly young-mature small scale 
operations with more than five years’ experience. They are therefore likely to offer more 
personalised services to borrowers and to know more about their creditworthiness. 
 
Third, the interest rate observed for rural banks is around 1.34 percentage points 
lower than the mean value reported by their urban bank counterparts. Normally one would 
expect that the lack of competition in village micro-credit markets would enable banks there 
to charge interest rates that might look abnormally high when compared with those of urban 
bank providers. The implication is that rural microbanks, like traditional village money 
lenders, have acquired a comparative advantage in drawing up credit contracts which help 
mitigate those adverse selection and moral hazard problems that have discouraged urban 
providers from lending to poor borrowers. Indeed, Cull et al (2009) remarked that in rural 
Bangladesh, MFI lenders have good relationship with their borrowers helping them to acquire 
reliable information at a relatively low cost. Further, it is more likely that the majority of rural 
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banks are government-sponsored agricultural lending agencies, often with a cap on their rates 
(Nwachukwu, 2013). 
Fourth, a further disaggregation by age and scale of operation in Figures 2A and 2B 
respectively indicates that interest rates tend to decline with increasing age and scale of 
outstanding loan portfolio for our average FSS-MFI regardless of its legal charter. Standard 
economic theory would lead us to suppose that reductions in costs driven by experience, 
learning by doing and economies of scale are responsible for the lower interest rates observed 
for mature and large scale MFIs. So for established institutions with more than eight years’ 
experience, microcredit interest rates dropped to an average of 27.31 percent a year, 
representing a fall of 1.97 percentage points from the overall sample average of 28.48 percent 
GLP. In terms of scale, we calculated that the mean interest rate for our large-scale FSS-MFI 
was 25.78 percent per annum vis-à-vis the 28.48 percent reported for our overall sample of 
FSS-MFI microlenders. Taken together, the entries in Figures 2A and 2B suggest that the 
drop in interest rates accompanying the scale of lending was larger than the fall in rates 
arising from experience allied with the age of an MFI; a difference of 1.53 percentage points. 
Generally speaking, the separation by type of MFI suggests that the implied inverse 
relationship between age and scale economies against interest rates is more pronounced 
across our FSS-NBFI sub-sample. The inference is that an interaction term which combines 
legal charter, age and scale of lending should be included in any empirical study which 
claims to investigate the determinants of interest charges levied by MFIs. The regression 
which we employ in this study to analyse how legal status, age and scale economies affect 
annual average interest rates of a developing country-FSS-MFI is outlined in the next section.   
2. Empirical Model and Hypotheses 
The argument here is carried out under the following headings:(i) model specification, (ii) 
independent variables of interest, (iii) control variables and (iv) empirical estimation method. 
2.1: Model specification 
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate how financially self-sufficient (FSS) 
microfinance institutions may influence their interest charges through the following three key 
policy initiatives: (i) the adoption of formalised banking practices, (ii) the acquisition of 
knowledge attained by serving clients over a long time period and (iii) the promotion of scale 
economies achieved by attending a growing number of borrowers and/or by increasing the 
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average size and duration of a loan offered to existing client base. The model which we 
estimated in order to quantify the influence of these three pricing strategies on annual average 
interest rates can be expressed in terms of the following regression equation. 
 
The variable YLD is the interest rate charged on loans. This was defined previously in section 
1.3 as total interest income divided by the gross loan portfolio7. It captures the ex-ante 
interest rate charged by the lender rather than the ex-post interest rate realized on outstanding 
portfolio since losses arising from loan default are not netted out of the interest revenues 
earned (Cull et al, 2009). 
2.2: Independent Variables of Interest 
The key independent variables in our analysis comprised: (i) the entry MATURE; a 
dichotomous dummy variable indicating the number of years the institution has been 
operating. Following the classification by MIX analysts, this variable takes a value 1if the 
institution has more than eight years of operation and 0otherwise. The decision to merge the 
NEW (i.e., age < 5 years) and the YOUNG (i.e., age between 5 and 8 years) variables to 
create a “NEW-YOUNG” dummy series follows from a lack of sufficient observations for 
each individual category in our dataset. (ii) The notation for LSCALE is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 for large-scale institutions and 0 otherwise.(iii) The term 
MICROBANK is a dummy variable for formally licenced microfinance banks which takes a 
value of 1 if the MFI is classified as a “rural bank” or “bank” and 0 for our three other types 
of institutions —NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions or cooperative societies. This sub-sample of 
institutions which do not have an authorised license to carry out conventional banking 
activities are collectively hereafter referred to as “NON-BANK-MFIs”. We recognize that 
our decision to lump together NGOs, NBFIs and Credit unions/cooperative is rather 
subjective and that differences in their charter status may lead to diverse cost structures with 
associated interest rates. Nevertheless, the decision not to include separate dummies for each 
type of MFI in the equation was based on the fact that there were too few observations of 
                                                          
7
 See Appendix Table 2 for the all the definition of variables in our analysis and their expected effect on 
microcredit interest rates. These definitions are abstracted from several publications of Microbanking Bulletin 
(MBB), a principal output for the MIX MARKET analysts and their sponsors.  
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them individually. The dummy variable categories which are excluded from the regression to 
avoid an exact linear association with the intercept term  are: (i) for age, NEW and 
YOUNG MFIs; (ii) for scale of operation, SMALL and MEDIUM SCALE MFIs, (iii) for 
legal status, NON-BANK MFIs which comprise NGOs, NBFIs and Credit 
unions/cooperative.This means that the constant term in equation 1 represents the annual 
average interest charge for these omitted classes of FSS-MFIs comprising the new-young-
small-medium-scale-non-bank microloan providers. Our null hypothesis is that the 
differential intercept coefficients are less than zero. The coefficient  shows how 
the annual average interest rate varies across MFIs by the nature of their accredited activities. 
We propose that the coefficient will have a positive sign if the extra costs to microfinance 
banks of complying with formalisation and prudential regulations were passed onto their 
borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and fees (Christen et al, 2003). 
As MFIs get older, they normally attempt to increase their customer base and also 
make progressively larger-sized loans to their existing clients with successful businesses. To 
investigate the significance of the implied combined effects on interest rates of age, scale 
economies and organisational charter, we include simultaneously in our regression model 
three interaction dummy variables. They are: (MATURE*LSCALE), 
(MATUREMICROBANK) and (LSCALE* MICROBANK). It is anticipated that the slope 
differential coefficient  on the combination (MATURE*LSCALE) will have a negative 
sign so as to reflect the additional productivity gains enjoyed by well-established-large scale 
MFIs, irrespective of charter status. We predict negative sign for the differential 
slopes on the interaction terms (MATUREMICROBANK) and (LSCALE* 
MICROBANK) in recognition of the fact that mature and large microbanks are more likely to 
have improved governance and internal controls and to be better at coping with the risk and 
cost associated with regulation and its supervision than their new-young and small-medium 
scale competitors. Such should instil confidence in external finance providers, leading to a 
lower cost of funding with a corresponding fall in interest charges. 
The symbol  is a dummy variable representing the effects of those unobserved 
characteristics such as managerial quality which are unique to a particular  MFI and which 
do not vary over time . These institution-specific dummies are treated as either fixed or 
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random parameters depending on the outcome of a test proposed by Hausman (1978)8. The 
symbol  is a dummy variable for time. These time indices are also treated as fixed or 
random in order to capture the dynamic changes in the rate of interest over our ten years of 
study. The notation  is the white noise error term with an expected value of zero. 
2.3: Control Variables and Expected Relationships 
The symbol in equation 1 is a vector comprising the set of control variables drawn from a 
pool of potential determinants theoretically or empirically linked to performance of MFIs in 
underdeveloped countries (Ahlin and Lin, 2006; Cull et al. 2007, Cull et al, 2009, Campion et 
al, 2010, Mersland, R. and Strøm, R. Ø, 2009; Nwachukwu, 2014). Generally speaking, 
Christen and Rosenberg (2000), Peck and Rosenberg (2000), Wollerand Schreiner (2002) 
indicated that several previous empirical studies which use the MIX MARKET dataset have 
consistently found ten institutional characteristics to be important drivers of interest rates on 
microloans aside from our dummies for age, scale and legal status. These ten conditioning 
variables have been added simultaneously to our extended regression in equation 2 below. 
 
Appendix Table 2 provides a summary of expected impact of these control variables on 
nominal interest rates. Two key trends emerge.  
First, eight out of the ten control variables in equation 2 are expected to be positively 
associated with interest rates. They are: (i) the ratio of the cost of funds to gross loan portfolio 
for an MFI , (ii) the ratio of operating expenses to gross loan portfolio , 
(iii) the percentage of money set aside by MFIs to cover potential loan defaults , (iv) 
the proportion of an MFI’s loans that have one or more principal instalments unpaid for more 
than thirty days past their due date , (v) the profit margin measured as net 
operating income relative to gross loan portfolio, (vi) the proportion of women borrowers 
                                                          
8
 The results of the Hausman test for fixed versus random model is not reported here in order to conserve space. 
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which supposedly captures the depth of outreach to the underprivileged population (vii) The 
ratio of equity capital to total assets  and (viii) the average loan size per borrower 
relative to the per capita GNI of the country in which the institution is located . 
Collectively, these variables capture the efficiency with which the MFI relates to its external 
capital providers as well as in the delivery and recovery of its loans from customers.  
Second, we expect a negative connection between interest rate and the remaining two 
conditioning variables (i) the ratio of borrowers to staff members  and (ii) the square 
of an average loan-size per borrower per capita GNI . The decision to include 
this quadratic term follows from the observation by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) that the 
greatest challenge facing most MFIs is how to recompense for the high fixed cost of lending 
in small amounts. Overall, these two variables were used in previous studies (Nwachukwu 
2014; Cotler and Almazan; 2013) as a proxy for an institution’s outreach to the more 
educated and wealthier borrowers with the capability to service larger loan sizes and to keep 
records of their business earnings and repayment history. Any subsequent reduction in 
operational costs and the risk of default should lower interest rates.  
2.4:Empirical Estimation Method 
To test the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses on the relationship between nominal 
interest rates and its key determinants, we employ two estimation techniques. The first is the 
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The second is the Two-stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) approach. With the three policy variables of interest – age of inception, scale of 
operation and charter status relatively time invariant, a random effect rather than fixed effect 
unbalanced panel data model is employed.  
A key requirement of the conventional random effect model is that all the explanatory 
variables in equation 2 are strictly exogenous in the sense that their values are determined 
outside the microcredit pricing system and so are uncorrelated with the unobservable MFI 
characteristics . But representations in Section 1 imply that this is a rather simplistic 
assumption. Our discussions there suggest that age and scale of operation may be correlated 
with other microfinance characteristics including organisational charter. Besides, arguments 
in Rosenberg (2007), Hudon (2007), Cull et al (2009), Campion (2010) and Cullet al (2011) 
suggest that there is probably a causal link between interest income and the institutional 
characteristics contained in our information conditioning set.  
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Empirically, the result of a Hausman test for exogeneity indicates that all the control 
variables described in section 2.3 are indeed jointly determined within our regression model 
and so must be treated as endogenous variables9. This is to be expected as these variables 
represent the institutional features which managers seek to influence in order to achieve 
optimal pricing for their niche market. Thus, the treatment of these variables as exogenous in 
a number of articles, including the influential paper by Cull et al (2007) which uses an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, may be deemed to be invalid. 
One technique frequently used for the estimation of systems of equations when 
contemporaneous variables are specified as endogenous is the Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS). The perennial problem of choosing valid instruments from freely available data is 
resolved by employing two period lagged values of all the variables in our conditioning set. 
These lagged instruments should be highly correlated with the endogenous regressors but 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term in equation 2 (i.e., strictly exogenous). 
Ideally, the restrictions placed on the choice of appropriate instruments and lag lengths 
should be informed by financial and economic theories. But often these concepts are at best 
vague or at worst non-existent. As a result, searching for exogenous variables to be used as 
instruments in simultaneous specifications has been carried out in an ad hoc manner. It has 
been argued that the measurement error associated with such an unplanned selection of 
external instruments could be minimised by using the VAR approach (Sims, 1980; McNees, 
1986). With respect to lag lengths, our priority was to include as many cross-sections of MFIs 
as possible in our regression analysis while ensuring that each of these institutions has full 
data for our measures of interest rate and its four key components.  
We recognise that the elements in equation 2 which are expressed at natural logarithm 
levels may contain unit roots and so should have been differenced to induce stationarity. 
Nonetheless, the resolution to run the regression at level follows that the objective of this 
article is to examine the relationship between interest rates and key MFI characteristics. 
Differencing would have resulted in a loss of any long-run information on the correlation 
between these variables. In any event, the transformation of all the regressors into natural 
logarithm series helps to lessen the problem of spurious regression by ensuring that the 
variables follow a linear trend and are integrated (Asteriou and Hall, 2007, Brooks, 2008). 
                                                          
9
 Once again, for the sake of brevity, the results of the Hausman test for exogeneity are not reported here, but are 
available on request from the authors. 
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The summary statistics for all the variables underpinning our study at natural 
logarithm levels are reported in Appendix Table3. From the standard deviations of the 
continuous variables in the conditioning set, we can conclude that there is sufficient variation 
in the dataset to ensure that acceptable estimated relationships would emerge. Appendix 
Table 4 presents the contemporaneous pairwise correlation matrix of our selected variables. 
We estimate the Kendall tau  rank correlation coefficient which deals with the problem of 
outlying observations and ties in the orderings of data. We note that the degree of 
interdependence between our explanatory variables is relatively low at under 0.5. This 
suggests that problems arising from multicollinearity are not a key concern in our regression 
model (Kennedy, 2008). Indeed, multicollinearity is rarely a problem in dynamic panels 
which pool a large cross-section of institutions from different countries. Such a data 
arrangement reduces the likelihood that the same common trend will be prevalent in the 
regressors in the specification. 
3. Estimation Results and Discussion 
The outcomes of our estimation for equation 2 using the OLS and 2SLS methods are 
presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 5 in that order. The regression in Column 2 
highlights how the sign, size and statistical significance of the coefficients vary with the 
correction of bias associated with endogenous variables. It is noteworthy that the 2SLS 
regression in Column 2 has the highest adjusted R-squared, indicating that 86.18 percent of 
the variation in interest rates is explained. Also, we deduce from the relatively high F-statistic 
with associated p-value that the null hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients (excluding 
the constant) are zero is rejected at the 5 percent confidence level. Further, a Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 2.18 indicates an absence of first-order serial correlation in the disturbance terms. 
Moreover, the relatively high J-statistic of 0.29 indicates the suitability of the instrumental 
variables used in the 2SLS regression. Consequently, our argument here on the determinants 
of microloan interest rates is confined to the estimated coefficients from the 2SLS regression 
presented in Column 2. The key findings may be summarised as follows:  
3.2.1. Age of inception of MFI and microcredit interest rates: The results in Appendix 
Table 5 indicate that the age of an MFI is inversely related to interest rates. This result is in 
line with the finding of Basharat et al (2015). We reported in Column 2, that the average 
interest rate for a mature MFI with more than eight years of experience is 0.017 percentage 
points lower than the rate for new-young institutions, other things being equal. This negative 
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differential slope rises to 0.03 percent, significant at 5 percent when age is combined with the 
scale dummy (i.e., MATURE*LSCALE). As noted by Cull et al (2007) and Campion et al 
(2010), this finding implies that knowledge accrued over time becomes increasingly 
important as an institution grows in size. The most likely explanation is that the negative 
correlation is capturing the cost-reducing effect of a movement along a learning curve over 
time. Established MFIs are more likely to have built up accurate information on the credit 
risk profile of their borrowers. They would therefore be able to adjust their lending practices, 
including the amount and terms of borrowing to suit the peculiar features of each customer. 
Consequently, it was advised by Campion et al, (2010) that nascent MFIs can leapfrog the 
difficulties associated with the early stages of a learning curve by investing in market surveys 
to gather client opinion on various aspects of the services which they have received. 
Interestingly, the differential slope coefficient on the MATURE*MICROBANK interaction 
term is insignificant. It appears that the impact on interest rate of experience acquired with 
the passage of time does not depend on whether the MFI has banking status or not.  
3.2.2. Scale of operation of MFI and microcredit interest rates: With respect to the US$ 
amount of gross loan portfolio outstanding, three findings are evident. First, large scale by 
itself as measured by the LSCALE term is statistically insignificant. Second, the importance 
of scale economies amongst our sub-sample of mature MFIs as captured by the 
MATURE*LSCALE variable is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The inference is 
that institutions need to have had at least eight years’ experience to avoid the errors that come 
from growing the number of borrowers and/or by increasing the average size and duration of 
a loan offered. Third, the significantly negative coefficient on the LSCALE*MICROBANK 
series is large at0.09 percent compared with the slope of the other covariates which capture 
the relevance of scale economies in loan pricing. The suggestion is that microbanks have 
higher fixed costs in the form of buildings, vehicles, computers and other IT equipment 
which can be spread over an increasing size and number of loans. The negative coefficient 
indicates that these lower costs are passed on to borrower in line with Bottomley (1964a, 
1964b, 1975). However, according to Gonzales (2007), Rosenberg et al (2009) and Campion 
et al (2010), these gains from economies of scale are exhausted beyond a certain point and 
unit costs begin rise. Hence, the negative coefficient here indicates that the dollar value of 
loan portfolio outstanding for the majority of our FSS-MFIs is below this cut-off point. 
3.2.3. Microbanking and microcredit interest rates: The significant positive coefficient of 
0.29 on the MICROBANK dummy in Column 2 conforms with the assertion by Christen 
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et.al (2003) that the extra costs of becoming a formal regulated microbank are passed on to 
borrowers through a higher annual average  interest rate. However, as noted in section 3.2.2 
above, MFIs with banking status are able to mitigate the predicted regulatory costs through 
economies of scale achieved by growing the dollar value of their outstanding loan portfolio. 
We reported that the annual interest rates for large-scale microbanks is 0.09 percentage point 
lower than the rate charged by their small-medium scale nonbank competitors.  
3.2.3. Other MFI characteristics and microcredit interest rates: Analysis of our regression 
model in Column 2 identified eight out of our ten control variables as statistically significant 
drivers of interest rates at the conventional 5 percent level, after accounting for the concurrent 
impact of all the regressors in equation 2, including age, scale and legal status. 
Consistent with Bottomley (1964a and 1975), Rosenberg et al (2009), Cotler (2010) 
and Basharat (2015) all the four components of interest have significant positive coefficients. 
The most important element in terms of size and level statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients is the net profit margin variable (LPROFTR). A one percentage point increase in 
anticipated net profit per unit of loan portfolio by our typical FSS-MFI will raise nominal 
interest rates by 0.12 percent, compared with 0.073 for operating costs (LOPELR), 0.03 for 
loan loss provisions (LPFLR) and 0.014 for cost of funding (LFELR). Contrary to the claim 
by Rosenberg et al (2009), the finding here suggests that the quest for higher profits is the 
most important reason for the differences in the lending interest rates among financially self-
sufficient MFIs. Such may be taken as evidence of “mission drift” unless we presume that the 
higher profit is re-invested in the expansion of outreach to underserved poorer communities. 
Other statistically significant positive determinants of interest rates in ascending order of their 
estimated slope coefficients are (i) the average loan size variable (LALPB), (ii) the 
percentage of female borrowers (LWBP) and (iii) borrowers per staff ratio (LBPSM). 
Consistent with Cull et al (2009) and Basharat et al (2015), these findings confirm that an 
increase in both the breadth and depth of outreach leads to a rise in interest charges.  
By contrast, interest rates are driven downwards by our measure of outreach to 
wealthier borrowers as represented by the square of loan size variable (LALPBSQ), even 
after controlling for the other firm characteristics in equation 2. The implication is that 
microlenders which target the better-off households and their medium scale enterprises with 
large loan sizes have succeeded in lowering operating costs, in particular administrative and 
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loan recovery expenses which are then passed on to their clients in the form of lower interest 
rates (Rosenberg et al, 2009; Cull et al, 2009; Cotler, 2010 and Basharat et al, 2015). 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper has contributed to the debate on the pricing of microloans by investigating how 
interest rates respond to: (i) knowledge which comes from the age of inception of an 
institution, (ii) scale economies arising from the number and size of dollar loan portfolio 
outstanding and (iii) the adoption of conventional banking practices. It focuses on annual 
time-series panel data for 300 financially self-sufficient MFIs from 107 countries across six 
developing regions from 2005 to 2015. The result of a random effect 2SLS estimator with 
related policies may be broadly summarised as follows: 
First, with respect to the explanatory power of our key variables of interest — age, 
scale and organisation charter, the result suggest that the conversion of MFIs into legally 
regulated banks has the greater significant relationship with the lending interest rates. These 
annual interest charges are pushed up, on average by 0.29 percentage points when MFIs 
transform into banks after controlling for age, scale and other determinants commonly cited 
in the microfinance literature. However, we found evidence that the costs incurred by 
microbanks may be significantly reduced by spreading them over a large number and dollar 
value of loan portfolios. One key policy recommendation is, therefore, to assist microbanks to 
grow their customer base and size of loans up to the cut-off point where evidence from 
Gonzales (2007), Rosenberg et al (2009) and Campion et al (2010) suggests that the implied 
cost competitive advantage vanishes. An example of initiative to increase scale of operations 
is for the authorities to loosening controls on the type of products and services which banks 
within and outside of the microfinance industry are allowed to offer. Such deregulation 
should incentivise large and well-established MFIs to takeover smaller-new-young firms in 
order to combine their more diverse range of products offered in different markets. 
Armendáriz and Szafarz, (2009) reported that cross-subsidization of expenses from various 
market segments and products helped to lower interest rates to the poorest clients. 
Second, in line with the findings of Rosenberg et al (2009), Cotler (2010) and 
Basharat et al (2015),the pursuit of higher profit goals by FSS-MFIs has a more noticeable 
positive impact than any of the other four components of interest rates, after controlling for 
other firm characteristics, in particular loan size and gender of the clientele. Such may be 
taken as evidence of “mission drift”, indicating that profit-driven shareholders are using their 
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involvement to exert pressure on the strategic pricing policy of MFIs. Therefore to reduce the 
fear that FSS-MFIs are deviating from their original mission, the authorities may implement 
the following five key policy actions which could help foster competition within the sector 
and/or encourage profit earned to be re-invested in the institution itself rather than distributed 
to shareholders or senior management. They are: (i) increasing taxes levied on profits which 
are not re-invested in welfare maximisation initiatives, (ii) setting up of a regulatory body 
which oversees accountability and transparency in the recording and timely publication of the 
audited accounts of MFIs, dividend payments and the names of their major recipients, (iii) 
creating  independent price comparison websites and agencies which rank the performance of 
MFIs on the basis of achievement of their globally stated social-objectives, (iv) advertising in 
national newspapers, on television, billboards, Facebook, Twitter and the other social media 
to encourage borrowers to seek out alternative lenders and to switch to cheaper providers and 
(v) campaigning aggressively in the popular media to name and shame the directors and 
shareholders of MFIs that charge “excessively” high interest rates. 
Third, the robustness of the positive sign of our measures of the general poverty level 
(size of loan), depth of outreach (percentage of women borrowers) and staff productivity 
(borrower to staff ratio), after controlling for the quality of portfolio loans outstanding 
suggests that a shift to socially-orientated objectives typically leads to higher interest rates. 
Consequently, important policy recommendations here are derived from strategies which 
could be used by MFIs and their sponsors to overcome the challenges which are inextricably 
linked with any involvement with the poor and their microbusinesses. Such policy initiatives 
may require that: (i) governments offer financial assistance and technical advice to MFIs on 
how to manage the risk associated with income generation in those microenterprises where 
the poorest population predominate and to design the range of products offered accordingly, 
(ii) MFIs themselves invest in modern technologies such as internet and mobile phone 
banking in order to lower their operating costs per borrower. Besides, using mobile vans to 
reach more low-income clients in remote rural areas rather than setting up branches there 
could further lower unit transaction costs and (iii) MFIs should be incentivised to hire local 
officers with a specialised knowledge of the culture and locality in which borrowers live and 
work in order to improve ease of access to, and communication with illiterate borrowers. 
Arguments in this paper provide some new insights on the differential impact of age, 
scale economies and legal status on microcredit interest rates. Nevertheless, we acknowledge 
that there are some limitations to this study. First, we accept the self-selection bias inherent 
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in the database from MIX MARKET.  Second, a lack of data on the key variables of interests 
in this study forced us to group together NGOs, NBFIs and Credit unions/cooperative into a 
dummy for NON-BANK MFIs. This was despite the fact that their different charter status 
may lead to diverse management and cost structures with associated interest rate charges. 
Thus, an important direction for a future research will be to include separate dummies for 
each type of MFI in a multivariate regression model. Third, we are unable to carry out 
empirical testing on the effect on interest rate of each of our aforementioned policy 
propositions. Such a rigorous statistical investigation is very difficult because of a lack of 
data at local market levels for individual MFIs over time from widely available databases 
such as MIX MARKET. This policy evaluation must be the subject of further research which 
uses information collected from questionnaires, field visits and interviews with senior 
management of MFIs to assess how they adjust interest rates to reflect age of inception, dollar 
value of loan portfolio, ownership structure and their “double bottom line” financial and 
social objectives.  
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Appendix Table 1: Mean and [Standard deviation]of Selected Sustainable MFI 
Characteristics used in the Study (2005-2015) 
Items  Credit 
Unions 
NBFIs NGOs Rural 
Banks 
Other 
Banks 
MIX-
MFIs 
1. Yield on GLP (nominal, %); YLD 
a New 27.67 
 [16.17] 
35.33 
 [24.10] 
31.965 
 [23.06] 
46.05 
 [20.30] 
33.405 
 [20.41] 
33.77 
 [22.78] 
b Young 24.3 
 [13.75] 
36.71 
 [23.71] 
34.63 
 [17.56] 
36.43 
 [16.43] 
28.8 
 [24.30] 
32.43 
 [21.30] 
c Mature 19.32 
[9.19] 
30.34 
[16.51] 
29.23 
[15.97] 
27.48 
[10.50] 
25.43 
[16.74] 
27.31 
[15.56] 
d Small scale 20.66 
 [13.64] 
39.49 
[24.29] 
34.11 
 [19.13] 
33.73 
[12.16] 
35.15 
[35.70] 
32.68 
[20.73] 
e Medium scale 21.77 
[9.39] 
35.39 
[19.56] 
30.33 
 [14.34] 
27.31 
[11.26] 
38.76 
[16.75] 
30.13 
[16.33] 
f Large scale 18.61 
[5.65] 
28.12 
 [16.14] 
26.52 
 [14.13] 
26.09 
[9.15] 
24.48 
[16.08] 
25.78 
[15.02] 
g All MFI sample 20.05 
[10.93] 
31.68 
 [20.16] 
29.86 
[16.71] 
28.14 
[11.51] 
26.80 
 [19.11] 
28.48 
[17.75] 
2 Financial expense (% GLP);FELR 
a New 6.63 
[8.84] 
5.13 
 [6.86] 
3.44 
[11.90] 
4.31 
[5.44] 
4.83 
[5.71] 
4.46 
[8.42] 
b Young 6.88 
[8.01] 
6.44 
[10.54] 
4.29 
[4.79] 
6.33 
[4.72] 
7.02 
[4.37] 
6.96 
[8.24] 
c Mature 5.17 
[5.40] 
6.51 
[4.52] 
5. 92 
[15.02] 
7.19 
[4.83] 
7. 92 
[5.02] 
6. 66 
[10.46] 
d Small scale 5.52 
[6.75] 
5.82 
[9.60] 
4.58 
[10.76] 
7.02 
[6.00] 
4.07 
[5.28] 
5.87 
[9.39] 
e Medium scale 7. 41 
[7.05] 
6.52 
 [6.30] 
5. 53 
[4.35] 
7.33 
[4.31] 
5.67 
[6.31] 
6.23 
[5.60] 
f Large scale 4.38 
[3.88] 
7.43 
[4.30] 
7.96 
[23.57] 
7.09 
[3.37] 
7.39 
[4.65] 
7. 58 
[12.66] 
g All MFI sample  5.58 
[6.39] 
6.28 
[7.13] 
5.88 
[13.70] 
7.78 
[4.93] 
7.73 
[5.08] 
6. 02 
[9.85] 
3 Operating expense (% GLP); OPELR 
a New 28. 84 
[29.24] 
39.32 
[54.54] 
42.77 
[54.35] 
37.49 
[24.20] 
51.87 
[56.96] 
40.07 
[52.14] 
b Young 18.56 
[15.32] 
28.55 
[23.27] 
28.02 
[20.04] 
29.61 
[18.83] 
29.16 
[35.44] 
26.03 
[22.97] 
c Mature 15.36 
[11.94] 
22.29 
[19.73] 
24.78 
[20.16] 
17.89 
[9.66] 
19.62 
[12.73] 
21.08 
[18.04] 
d Small scale 18.56 
[19.04] 
37.09 
[44.37] 
32.48 
[30.75] 
21.83 
[14.56] 
55.43 
[60.12] 
30.73 
[33.92] 
e Medium scale 14.34 
[8.46] 
27.29 
[20.10] 
23.17 
[14.47] 
19.59 
[11.73] 
42.89 
[42.33] 
24.02 
[18.42] 
f Large scale 13.96 
[8.03] 
18.41 
[14.62] 
17.12 
[11.70] 
16.22 
[8.32] 
18.65 
[13.76] 
17.37 
[12.97] 
g All MFI sample  16.17 
[14.85] 
26.71 
[29.74] 
26.32 
[23.75] 
19.88 
[12.32] 
24. 43 
[28.19] 
24. 61 
[24.86] 
 Provision for loan impairment (% GLP);PFLR 
a New 1.72 
[8.34] 
1.15 
[3.25] 
1.49 
[3.16] 
0.46 
[0.99] 
4.73 
[9.33] 
1.79 
[5.02] 
b Young 1.04 
[2.24] 
2.18 
[4.00] 
1.65 
[2.90] 
1.68 
[2.67] 
3.34 
[4.42] 
2.14 
[3.51] 
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c Mature 1.88 
[2.68] 
2.47 
[4.04] 
3.51 
[45.20] 
0.35 
[1.90] 
2.48 
[5.80] 
2.75 
[29.45] 
d Small scale 1.68 
[4.35] 
1.59 
[4.26] 
1.64 
[8.60] 
0.13 
[1.91] 
2.95 
[14.26] 
1.91 
[6.77] 
e Medium scale 1.75 
[2.51] 
2.86 
[4.04] 
2.33 
[3.94] 
0.76 
[2.23] 
2.71 
[5.27] 
2.97 
[3.76] 
f Large scale 1.37 
[2.00] 
2.76 
[3.40] 
6.72 
[82.58] 
0.56 
[1.34] 
2.25 
[4.42] 
3.34 
[42.46] 
g All MFI sample  1.72 
[3.53] 
2.28 
[3.90] 
2.79 
[39.66] 
0.57 
 [1.94] 
2.77 
[6.15] 
2.71 
[24.50] 
4 Net profit (% GLP);PROFTLR 
a New -1.71 
[23.36] 
-2.15 
[35.81] 
-2.18 
[25.40] 
4.46 
[5.97] 
-6.65 
[21.53] 
-2.46 
[30.32] 
b Young 2.76 
[11.12] 
4.14 
[11.95] 
4.09 
[12.86] 
7.65 
[9.65] 
1.35 
[11.25] 
3.38 
[12.02] 
c Mature 2.77 
[8.30] 
3.87 
[12.52] 
0.42 
[110.92] 
5.65 
[4.74] 
5.59 
[10.86] 
2.74 
[72.35] 
d Small scale 1.19 
[14.64] 
0.87 
[29.43] 
1.75 
[26.10] 
5.11 
[5.89] 
-0.71 
[31.08] 
1.87 
[24.41] 
e Medium scale 1.46 
[5.29] 
4.15 
[13.55] 
3.26 
[10.48] 
5.22 
[5.71] 
0.33 
[13.53] 
3.66 
[10.75] 
f Large scale 2.45 
[4.55] 
4.23 
[6.60] 
-4.63 
[202.09] 
4.73 
[3.11] 
3.66 
[8.72] 
1.35 
[103.79] 
g All MFI sample  1.93 
[11.16] 
2.23 
[19.34] 
0.53 
[97.63] 
5.68 
[5.39] 
2.08 
[13.24] 
1.94 
[61.05] 
5 Portfolio at risk after 30 days (% GLP);PAR30 
a New 3.33 
[4.19] 
3.02 
[7.94] 
1.38 
[3.22] 
13.24 
[14.03 
5.47 
[9.67] 
3.22 
[7.45] 
b Young 5.76 
[5.98] 
5.17 
[8.79] 
3.07 
[6.10] 
9.48 
[8.90] 
4.61 
[8.72] 
4.53 
[7.75] 
c Mature 8.36 
[10.14] 
6.49 
[8.40] 
7.41 
[11.33] 
10.37 
[12.69] 
5.04 
[8.40] 
7.01 
[10.47] 
d Small scale 7.68 
[10.93] 
5.73 
[8.72] 
6.41 
[11.07] 
12.27 
[15.35] 
8.95 
[14.51] 
6.22 
[11.02] 
e Medium scale 7.48 
[7.46] 
6.55 
[9.75] 
6.53 
[10.56] 
11.51 
[9.66] 
6.15 
[9.71] 
6.94 
[9.87] 
f Large scale 7.39 
[6.38] 
5.25 
[7.25] 
5.16 
[8.90] 
8.35 
[10.49] 
4.13 
[7.57] 
5.94 
[7.92] 
g All MFI sample  7.78 
[9.20] 
5.44 
[8.48] 
6.68 
[10.46] 
10.36 
[12.46] 
5.88 
[8.62] 
6.89 
[9.78] 
6 Average loan balance per borrower (per capita GNI);ALPBP 
a New 1.25 
[1.76] 
1.18 
[3.35] 
0.37 
[0.44] 
0.13 
[0.37] 
2.45 
[5.68] 
1.37 
[3.11] 
b Young 1.29 
[1.77] 
0.52 
[1.80] 
0.63 
[0.39] 
0.27 
[0.52] 
2.45 
[4.35] 
0.54 
[1.96] 
c Mature 1.67 
[2.45] 
0.95 
[1.36] 
0.54 
[0.66] 
0.39 
[0.57] 
1.86 
[6.80] 
0.72 
[2.42] 
d Small scale 1.37 
[2.60] 
0.76 
[2.51] 
0.44 
[0.29] 
0.92 
[0.51] 
0.63 
[0.81] 
0.79 
[1.80] 
e Medium scale 1.69 
[2.22] 
0.93 
[1.57] 
0.49 
[0.42] 
0.93 
[0.48] 
1.84 
[4.17] 
0.97 
[1.56] 
f Large scale 1.42 
[1.26] 
0.68 
[1.74] 
0.93 
[1.09] 
0.32 
[0.77] 
2.28 
[6.82] 
1.91 
[3.47] 
g All MFI sample  1.85 
[2.27] 
0.84 
[2.01] 
0.39 
[0.61] 
0.98 
[0.56] 
2.13 
[6.25] 
0.84 
[2.43] 
7 Female borrower (% total borrowers);WBP 
a New 57.36 
[27.09] 
62.93 
[26.32] 
77.73 
[32.39] 
47.20 
[24.09] 
41.35 
[21.85] 
63.13 
[29.39] 
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b Young 54.82 
[23.52] 
61.81 
[25.95] 
79.83 
[42.65] 
53.90 
[26.68] 
42.53 
[18.63] 
64.39 
[33.52] 
c Mature 56.70 
[215.47] 
59.53 
[24.71] 
75.19 
[23.70] 
50.57 
[32.18] 
57.55 
[23.44] 
65.42 
[88.58] 
d Small scale 51.83 
[22.42] 
61.07 
[24.73] 
79.15 
[30.25] 
43.16 
[29.29] 
53.89 
[24.45] 
66.76 
[29.97] 
e Medium scale 77.48 
[348.81] 
60.52 
[25.52] 
74.23 
[25.14] 
54.13 
[31.25] 
61.72 
[27.32] 
68.67 
[136.01] 
f Large scale 39.92 
[19.33] 
58.85 
[25.84] 
74.48 
[26.26] 
61.45 
[31.30] 
50.49 
[22.36] 
59.83 
[26.88] 
g All MFI sample  56.19 
[180.57] 
60.21 
[25.38] 
76.51 
[28.07] 
48.85 
[31.14] 
50.72 
[23.67] 
63.61 
[75.61] 
8 Borrower per staff member;BPSM 
a New 71.18 
[76.97] 
103.11 
[132.10] 
149.33 
[116.95] 
111.73 
[87.81] 
423.95 
[1939.97] 
143.81 
[630.63] 
b Young 104.50 
[115.52] 
127.30 
[119.37] 
155.57 
[92.49] 
107.71 
[75.71] 
116.96 
[448.25] 
130.99 
[170.20] 
c Mature 118.81 
[129.54] 
138.29 
[139.15] 
158.03 
[128.78] 
107.36 
[115.20] 
113.80 
[87.80] 
139.98 
[128.78] 
d Small scale 82.44 
[89.05] 
103.46 
[129.57] 
149.74 
[122.74] 
 
96.82 
[141.11] 
 
45.35 
[47.38] 
 
118.11 
[122.72] 
e Medium scale 141.56 
[163.76] 
114.23 
[89.86] 
159.27 
[129.57] 
113.26 
[56.18] 
182.71 
[558.22] 
139.54 
[165.13] 
f Large scale 142.97 
[120.95] 
160.58 
[153.30] 
171.53 
[113.07] 
120.38 
[122.57] 
162.57 
[790.60] 
160.75 
[385.06] 
g All MFI sample  111.65 
[123.65] 
128.14 
[133.23] 
157.92 
[122.92] 
107.72 
[110.71] 
153.45 
[724.60] 
137.57 
[248.59] 
9 Equity capital (% total assets);ECAR 
a New 24.53 
[20.67] 
44.91 
[32.04] 
 49.06 
[44.82] 
25.76 
[18.01] 
41.20 
[26.20] 
42.04 
[34.32] 
b Young 27.28 
[20.13] 
40.47 
[29.74] 
43.07 
[34.13] 
15.34 
[9.36] 
22.95 
[21.00] 
36.54 
[29.85] 
c Mature 29.94 
[81.53] 
28.76 
[21.23] 
37.05 
[26.52] 
15.62 
[8.26] 
20.83 
[21.57] 
30.81 
[39.76] 
d Small scale 31.96 
[80.52] 
48.54 
[32.75] 
44.76 
[33.23] 
19.59 
[11.46] 
36.53 
[45.30] 
40.81 
[46.89] 
e Medium scale 30.74 
[72.28] 
35.72 
[22.75] 
36. 45 
[26.33] 
13.73 
[7.53] 
37.98 
[25.51] 
32.83 
[36.21] 
f Large scale 20.05 
[12.93] 
22.87 
[15.45] 
29.18 
[22.00] 
13.79 
[4.85] 
19.27 
[15.40] 
23.90 
[17.48] 
g All MFI sample  28.83 
[69.42] 
35.86 
[26.91] 
38.85 
[29.70] 
16.21 
[9.45] 
23.01 
[23.11] 
33.28 
[37.59] 
Notes: (i) Definitions of variables are provided in Section 2 in the text. Datais abstracted from MIX market 
database at: www.mixmarket.com. (ii) The categories New, Young and Mature MFIs have been in operation for 
1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years and more than 8 years respectively. (iii) The group of Small scale MFIs have gross loan 
portfolio (GLP) outstanding of less than US$2million in SSA, Asia, ECA and MENA. The figure for Latin 
America is less than $4 million. Medium-scale MFIs have GLP of between US$2million and US$8 million in 
SSA, Asia, ECA and MENA. The corresponding figure of Latin America is between US$4 million and US$15 
million. Large scale MFIs in SSA, Asia, ECA and MENA have GLP of more than US$8 million while those in 
Latin America have GLP of more than US$15 million. Numbers reported in [……] are standard deviations 
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Appendix Table 2: Independent Variables and Expected Relationships 
Variable 
Symbol 
Variable Name Expected 
Relationship 
 
A dummy variable which captures that the number of years the 
institution has been in operation. It takes a value of 1if the institution has 
more than eight years of operation and 0 otherwise 
- 
 
A dummy variable which captures the size of the gross loan portfolio 
outstanding in US$. It takes a value of 1 for MFIs which are classified as 
large scale in the MIX market database and 0 otherwise. 
- 
 
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the MFI is classified as a 
“rural bank” or “bank” and 0 for our three other types of institutions —
NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions or cooperative societies. 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of financial expenses percentage of gross loan 
portfolio 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of operating expenses as a percentage of gross 
loan portfolio 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of provision for loan impairment as a percentage 
of gross loan portfolio 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of net profit  as a percentage of gross loan 
portfolio 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of provision for loan impairment as a percentage 
of gross loan portfolio 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of women borrowers as a percentage of total 
borrowers 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of borrower per staff member - 
 
The natural logarithm of one plus equity capital as a percentage of total 
assets in order to reduce the range of variation and surmount the 
problems associated with negative observations. According to MIX, the 
equity variable is adjusted for donations and other forms of subsidies. 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of average loan balance per borrower  per capita 
of gross national income (GNI) 
+ 
 
The natural logarithm of the square of average loan balance per 
borrower per capita of gross national income (GNI) 
- 
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Appendix Table 3:  Descriptive statistics of variables at natural logarithm levels used in the regression 
 
LYLD 
 
 
 
MATURE 
 
 
 
LSCALE 
 
 
 
MATURE* 
LSCALE 
 
 
MICRBNK 
 
 
MATURE* 
MICRBNK 
 
 
LSCALE* 
MICRBNK 
 
 
LFELR 
 
 
 
LOPELR 
 
 
 
LPFLR 
 
 
 
LPROFTR 
 
 
 
LPAR30 
 
 
 
LWBP 
 
 
 
LBPSM 
 
 
 
LECAR 
 
 
 
LALPB 
 
 
Mean 0.252 0.740 0.364 0.306 0.130 0.101 0.074 -3.019 -1.674 0.024 0.027 -3.519 -0.566 4.672 0.2593 -2.302 
Median 0.243 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.777 -1.711 0.015 0.038 -3.297 -0.468 4.745 0.2187 -2.337 
Max 1.059 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.062 1.128 0.651 1.939 0.000 0.375 8.933 2.507 7.082 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -9.145 -5.203 -0.358 -2.888 -9.210 -6.266 1.099 -2.735 -11.756 
Std. Dev 0.141 0.439 0.481 0.461 0.336 0.301 0.261 1.060 0.698 0.038 0.153 1.421 0.578 0.760 0.179 2.375 
Skewness 0.489 -1.095 0.564 0.841 2.202 2.653 3.265 -1.844 -0.125 3.615 -6.388 -0.851 -2.626 -0.478 -0.466 0.159 
Kurtosis 4.145 2.200 1.318 1.706 5.848 8.037 11.66 7.958 3.990 42.73 99.59 4.366 17.618 4.995 29.70 3.077 
Jarque-Bera 
[prob.value] 
375.74 
[0.000] 
902.18 
[0.000] 
680.10 
[0.000] 
746.10 
[0.000] 
4560.21 
[0.000] 
8875.83 
[0.000] 
19518.82 
[0.000] 
6331.20 
[0.000] 
172.88 
[0.000] 
270438.3 
[0.000] 
1574384 
[0.000] 
790.09 
[0.000] 
40012.46 
[0.000] 
811.71 
[0.000] 
118390.8 
[0.000] 
17.839 
[0.000] 
No. Obs 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 2780 2790 2890 2800 2785 
LYLD = the natural log of the logarithm of nominal portfolio yield variable; MATURE is a dummy variablewhich takes a value of1 if the institution has more than eight years of operation and 0 otherwise. LSCALE 
is dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for MFIs which are classified as large scale in the MIX market database and 0 otherwise. MATURE*LSCALE is the product of the dummies for mature with large scale 
MFIs. MICRBNK is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the MFI is classified as a “rural bank” or “bank” and 0 for our three other types of institutions —NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions or cooperative 
societies. MATURE*MICRBNK is an interaction term which is created by multiplying the dummies for mature with microbank MFIs.  LSCALE*MICRBNK is the product of the dummiesfor large scale with 
microbank MFIs.  LFELR is the natural logarithmoffinancial expenses percentage of gross loan portfolio. LOPELR is the natural ofoperating expenses as a percentage of gross loan portfolio.LPFLR is the natural 
logarithm ofprovision for loan impairment as a percentage of gross loan portfolio. LPROFTRis the natural logarithm ofNet profit as a percentage of gross loan portfolio.  LPAR30 is the natural logarithm ofprovision 
for loan impairment as a percentage of gross loan portfolio. LWBP is the natural logarithm ofwomen borrowers as a percentage of total borrowers. LBPSM is the natural logarithm ofbborrower per staff member. 
LECAR is the natural logarithm ofEquity capital as a percentage of total assets. LALPB is the natural logarithm of aaverage loan balance per borrower per capita of gross national income. 
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Appendix Table 4: Pairwise Correlation Analysis: Kendall’s tau-b: Sample 2005 to 2010  
 
LYLD 
 
 
1 
MATURE 
 
 
2 
LSCALE 
 
 
3 
MATURE* 
LSCALE 
 
4 
MICRBNK 
 
5 
MATURE* 
MICRBNK 
 
6 
LSCALE* 
MICRBNK 
 
7 
LFELR 
 
 
8 
LOPELR 
 
 
9 
LPFLR 
 
 
10 
LPROFTR 
 
 
11 
LPAR30 
 
 
12 
LWBP 
 
 
13 
LBPSM 
 
 
14 
LECAR 
 
 
15 
LALPB 
 
 
16 
1 1                
2 -0.094*** 1               
3 
-0.064*** 0.173*** 1              
4 
-0.071*** 0.394*** 0.878*** 1             
5 
-0.003 0.031** 0.163*** 0.128*** 1            
6 -0.022* 0.198*** 0.158*** 0.207*** 0.866*** 1           
7 -0.018 0.044*** 0.372*** 0.307*** 0.730*** 0.663*** 1          
8 0.159*** -0.003 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.096*** 1         
9 0.478*** -0.129*** -0.222*** -0.216 -0.004 -0.052*** -0.049*** -0.042*** 1        
10 0.148*** -0.015 0.028** 0.017 -0.017 -0.042*** 0.012 0.026** 0.167*** 1       
11 0.176*** 0.004 0.034*** 0.034** 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.016 0.001 -0.052*** -0.124*** 1      
12 -0.034*** 0.121*** -0.059*** -0.016 0.004 0.016 -0.029** -0.008 0.066*** 0.247*** -0.188*** 1     
13 0.099*** 0.009 -0.086*** -0.074*** -0.107*** -0.064*** -0.093*** 0.002 0.121*** -0.022** 0.011 -0.132*** 1    
14 -0.035*** 0.080*** 0.126*** 0.122*** -0.057*** -0.022* -0.017 -0.026** -0.112*** -0.016 0.051*** -0.132*** 0.285*** 1   
15 0.119*** -0.069*** -0.203*** -0.194*** -0.155*** -0.168*** -0.135*** -0.308*** 0.153*** -0.002 0.153*** -0.028** -0.013 -0.035***   
16 -0.210*** 0.005 0.135*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.100*** 0.124*** -0.018* -0.225*** -0.014 -0.013 0.085*** -0.389*** -0.349*** -0.059*** 1 
Notes: (i) Asterisks *,**,*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. No asterisk means that the coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero. (ii) Included observations after adjustment: 3000. (iii) Definitions of variables and expected effects on interest income are provided in Appendix Table 2. LYLD = the natural log of the 
logarithm of nominal portfolio yield variable; MATURE is a dummy variablewhich takes a value of1 if the institution has more than eight years of operation and 0 otherwise. LSCALE is dummy variable which takes 
a value of 1 for MFIs which are classified as large scale in the MIX market database and 0 otherwise. MATURE*LSCALE is the product of the dummies for mature with large scale MFIs. MICRBNK is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 if the MFI is classified as a “rural bank” or “bank” and 0 for our three other types of institutions —NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions or cooperative societies. MATURE*MICRBNK is 
an interaction term which is created by multiplying the dummies for mature with microbank MFIs.  LSCALE*MICRBNK is the product of the dummiesfor large scale with microbank MFIs.  LFELR is the natural 
logarithmoffinancial expenses percentage of gross loan portfolio. LOPELR is the natural ofoperating expenses as a percentage of gross loan portfolio.LPFLR is the natural logarithm ofprovision for loan impairment 
as a percentage of gross loan portfolio. LPROFTRis the natural logarithm ofNet profit as a percentage of gross loan portfolio.  LPAR30 is the natural logarithm ofprovision for loan impairment as a percentage of 
gross loan portfolio. LWBP is the natural logarithm ofwomen borrowers as a percentage of total borrowers. LBPSM is the natural logarithm ofbborrower per staff member. LECAR is the natural logarithm ofEquity 
capital as a percentage of total assets. LALPB is the natural logarithm of aaverage loan balance per borrower per capita of gross national income. 
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 Column 1 Column 2 
Explanatory variables OLS. Regression 2SLS. Regression 
CONSTANT 0.378 [0.000]*** 0.3616 [0.000]*** 
MATURE -0.010 [0.100]* -0.017 [0.052]** 
LSCALE 0.007 [0.457] 0.011 [0.743] 
MICROBANK 0.237 [0.004]*** 0.291 [0.0001]*** 
MATURE*LSCALE -0.013 [0.168] -0.026 [0.040]** 
MATURE*MICROBANK 0.007 [0.731] 0.031 [0.385] 
LSCALE* MICROBANK -0.003 [0.844] -0.090 [0.028]** 
LFELR 0.015 [0.000]*** 0.014 [0.000]*** 
LOPELR 0.081 [0.000]*** 0.0729 [0.000]*** 
LPFLR 0.0884 [0.036]** 0.031 [0.047]** 
LPROFTR 0.124 [0.000]*** 0.124 [0.000]*** 
LPAR30 0.001 [0.407] 0.005 [0.061]* 
LWBP 0.014 [0.003]*** 0.047 [0.025]** 
LBPSM 0.008 [0.135] 0.012 [0.050]** 
LECAR 0.025 [0.081]* -0.014 [0.444] 
LALPB -0.194 [0.955] 0.224 [0.054]** 
LALPBSQ 0.098 [0.609] -0.114 [0.049]** 
Cross-sections included 300 300 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 2700 2000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7679 0.8618 
F-statistic [probability] 13.91[0.000]*** 19.65 [0.000]*** 
Probability (J-statistic) …….. 0.2879 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.382 2.177 
Notes: (i) Asterisks *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level 
respectively, (ii) Numbers in [….] are the estimated probability values, (iii) The dependent variable of all the 
models are the natural logarithm of nominal portfolio yield variable (LYLD), (vi) The lower number of 
observations in 2SLS vis-à-vis the OLS method is due to adjustments in data available for the variables used as 
instrument in the regression analysis . 
Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 2. For brevity, estimates for cross-section and time-period 
dummies are not reported here, but are available from the author on request. 
The equation which is analysed here is summarised in equation 2 as follows: 
Appendix Table 5: Regression Results 
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